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protests at a draft center. 14 This essay examines those charges. It reviews Blakey's specific criticisms of the Court's decision. 15 It then analyzes each of those criticisms. This essay concludes that Blakey is crying wolf. Blakey is incorrect when he argues that the Supreme Court affirmed the intimidation of political and social protesters. In fact, the Court in Scheidler decided only a narrow question concerning the meaning of "enterprise" 16 and did not decide whether "non-violent" protest is chargeable as a RICO offense. This essay also examines Blakey's suggestion that RICO is available against extortionists like Don Corleone, but not protesters like Dr. Spock. Despite his suggestion in "The RICO Racket" that RICO is suitable for one class of criminals but not another, Professor Blakey has repeatedly argued that RICO applies to everyone who violates its broadly worded substantive provisions. Following Professor Blakey's lead, courts have taken an expansive view of RICO's legislative history and rejected efforts to limit RICO to a specific class of criminal defendants. 17 Further, in assessing Blakey's claim that Scheidler is symptomatic of the New Textualism, this essay examines the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting RICO's substantive provisions. Most of those decisions antedate the current Court's flirtation with the New Textualism. This examination shows that Blakey's claim that Scheidler represents a different approach to statutory construction is unfounded.1 8 Finally, this essay compares the position Professor Blakey took on RICO in his past writings with the position he takes in "The Rico Racket." As RICO's primary draftsman, Blakey has been an influential commentator. 19 Throughout the RICO debate, Professor Blakey has been the primary advocate of reading RICO's terms broadly. His past writings have consistently criticized efforts to limit RICO, 20 and he has shown scorn for those who complain when their constituencies have been impaled on RICO. 2 
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Advocate Blakey who has failed to demonstrate his high principles now that the tables have been turned and his client has felt the sting of RICO. 22 II. "THE RICO RACKET": ADVoCATE BLAKEVs CRITIQUE OF THE
COURT
In "The RICO Racket," Blakey accuses the Supreme Court of coming "perilously close to equating demonstrators with 'racketeers.' 23 Blakey argues that when RICO was originally proposed by Senator McClellan, Senators Phillip Hart and Ted Kennedy objected that it might be applied "beyond organized crime" to antiwar demonstrators. 2 4 To meet their objections and those of the ACLU, Senator McClellan told Blakey to strike the language that gave the senators concern. Blakey did so, and "[n]o offense relating to trespass or vandalism in the context of protests was included in the final version of RICO." 25 Hence, Blakey claims, RICO was intended to reach only "organized commercial exploitation," 26 and posed no threat to First Amendment rights.
In "The RICO Racket," Blakey implies that in rejecting the economic motive requirement for a RICO enterprise, the Supreme Court was wrong in deciding the case based on what he calls a "new judicial philosophy aptly termed the 'New Textualism. '" 27 He claims that the Court has allowed NOW to turn RICO into a "weapon of terror against First Amendment freedoms." 28 "The RICO Racket" argues that a person like Scheidler, a proponent of non-violence, is not an intended target of RICO. Blakey states that there is "[a] world of legal difference .. .between a Vito Corleone who uses a mob-dominated union" to extort money from a restaurateur and "a Benjamin Spock who sits in a draft-board office to protest the war in Vietnam."2 In context, Blakey may be arguing only that RICO should cover merely extortion and not non-violent protests. But it also suggests that only some defendants, "mobsters" or Mafiosi, are suitable targets of RICO.
Thus, Blakey raises two or possibly three distinct and sharp objec- 
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tions to Scheidler First, the Court endorsed a policy that allows harassment of non-violent protesters and the trampling of their First Amendment freedom; second, the decision in Scheidler allows the government to use RICO against unsuitable classes of defendants, like the Dr. Spocks of the world, instead of exclusively the Don Corleones; third, the Court ignored clear legislative history that would have produced a contrary result and deferred improperly to RICO's text.
HI. DOES SCHEIDLER CHILL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROTEST OF ALL
TYPES?
The Court's decision in Scheidler has obvious political overtones. It is one more battle in the abortion wars. In 1993, pro-choice forces were rebuffed by the Court when they attempted to use civil rights legislation to create a basis for federal law enforcement involvement against anti-abortion protesters. 3 0 The decision in Scheidler leaves open the possibility of federal involvement. But it is easy to overstate the case. The plaintiffs in Scheidler are far from succeeding at trial.3' Rather, they merely withstood a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim for relief. As discussed below, as a tool against anti-abortion foes, RICO is fraught with difficulty. The 1994 legislation criminalizing specified conduct at abortion clinics will be a far more effective law enforcement tool. Even if Schidler is a victory for the pro-choice movement, it is certainly not a violent blow to First Amendment freedoms, as Blakey alleged. In Scheidler, the Court answered a very narrow question and did so in a rather non-controversial manner. In fact, abortion foe Chief Justice Rehnqust 33 wrote the opinion in Scheidler and did so for a unanimous court. 3 35 The district court dismissed all three claims, largely because the plaintiffs failed to allege "some profit-generating purpose." 3 6 The Seventh Circuit affirmed thatjudgment.
7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve an inter-circuit conflict whether a RICO enterprise must have an economic motive. 3 8 The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. 39 Its analysis was straightforward. It examined RICO's definition of "enterprise" and found that the term was broadly defined and did not require that an enterprise have an economic motive. 40 The Court examined the requirement that the enterprise's activity affect interstate commerce and concluded, without discussion, that an enterprise can have such an effect "without having its own profit-seeking motives."
The strongest argument in favor of limiting RICO claims to profit-seeking activities is that § § 1962(a)-(b) refer to enterprises run for profit and that "enterprise" in § 1962(c) should be defined narrowly. The Court concluded that, while an "enterprise" in § § 1962 (a) and (b) will usually be a profit seeking entity, such enterprises may lack an economic motive. 4 2 Therefore, a subsection (c) enterprise also need not be profit-motivated.
The 40 Id. at 803-04 ("RICO broadly defines 'enterprise' in § 1961(4) ... nowhere in either § 1962(c), or in the RICO definitions in § 1961, is there any indication that an economic motive is required."). 41 Id. at 804. 42 Id. Before the Court, Advocate Blakey argued that "the common everyday meaning of 'enterprise' is a business venture." Health Care, supra note 26. Conceding that a government may be a RICO enterprise, he argued that the "commercial dimension" permeates the statute and "lies in the word 'affairs.'" Further, he stated that "illicit gain" can be found in the statute because its interpretation is a "holistic" endeavor. Id. The Supreme Court did not respond to these specific arguments. The Supreme Court was unimpressed. First, the Court found that, even if the predicate offenses did not benefit the protesters, these offenses could have an effect on the economy by damaging the targeted businesses. 46 Second, the Supreme Court previously refused to limit RICO's application to the specific evil that gave rise to RICO. 47 While RICO originated with concern about organized crime, "'Congress... chose to enact a more general statute, one which... was not limited in application to organized crime."' 4 8
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Despite the fact that the Court found that RICO applies to activities that are not profit-motivated, the decision in Scheidler does not come "perilously close to equating demonstrators with 'racketeers. '" 49 First, despite Blakey's statements in "The RICO Racket," the record does not support his claim that his client was a non-violent protester. Before trial, Scheidler prevailed on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. 5 0 At that stage, the district court must assume that all of the non-moving party's allegations are true. 5 60 Clarke Forsythe, vice president and general counsel of Americans United for Life said this decision "may trigger RICO's abuse as a nuclear weapon against free speech rights." John Corcoran, High Caliber Deterrent, Juois, Spring 1994, at 32, 34 (quoting Lyle Denniston, Abortion Protests May Be Costly, PrTSBURGH Posr GAZETTE, January 25, 1994, at A9). Bruce Ledewitz, Professor of Law at Duquesne University, asserted "if abortion demonstrators twice push their way into a clinic's waiting room, occupy it and block the hallways and refuse to move, the demonstrators are subject to RICO. They may be jailed for 20 years . . .and be made to pay treble damages and/or punitive damages." Professor Ledewitz asserted that a sit-in should be discouraged by local trespass laws, not felony prosecution under RICO. Corcoran, supra, at 32, 34 (quoting Bruce Ledewitz, RICO's Latest Victim-Social Protest, WALL ST. J., February 2, 1994, at A17).
The student author of High Caliber Deterrent suggests that protesters may be unwilling to "be a test case for RICO" because of exposure to severe sanctions. That ignores the fact that Scheidleris already a test case for whether peaceful protest can amount to extortion or other underlying predicate offenses for purposes of RICO. As discussed above, the Blakey faults the ACLU for abandoning the position it had advocated when RICO was first before Congress. 6 1 But that criticism is off the mark. According to Blakey's own statements, liberal senators and the ACLU lobbied to have the underlying predicate offenses changed so that trespass and vandalism, crimes of not so peaceful antiwar protesters, were not among the predicate offenses. 62 The decision in Scheidler is a far cry from holding that protesters could be liable based on that conduct alone. The time to assess the ACLU's performance is after a fact finder determines that Scheidler did nothing more than engage in peaceful protest or in the kind of vandalism and trespass in which antiwar protesters engaged. Blakey then may fault the ACLU if it were to fail to join a challenge to RICO.
"The RICO Racket" is also curious for its claim that the ACLU sat idly by while the Court turned RICO on its head. 63 As noted, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of neither party. 64 The ACLU argued, consistent with Professor Blakey's published views, that the Court should not read an economic motive requirement into the statute. But the ACLU then urged the Court to adopt careful guidelines if it remanded the case to the district court for trial. It stated specifically, consistent with its previous position concerning RICO generally, that RICO prosecutions are fraught with potential First Amendment problems. 65 The ACLU also reminded the Court of important limitations that the Court had imposed in other cases involving protest activity. For example, the Court has distinguished between peaceful protest and acts of extortion and between those who further legitimate goals of an organization and those who have the specific intent Supreme Court did not decide that issue and, if NOW prevails in the Scheidler case, that issue will be litigated on appeal. High Caliber Deterrent also ignores the possibility of a declaratory judgment action to decide whether the government may use RICO against protesters. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) . That remedy would be available as long as the case was ripe and there were no pending proceedings.
The antiabortion foes quoted in High Caliber Deterrent are inaccurate. For example, Professor Ledewitz's hypothetical ignores other RICO requirements. In his example, there is no "pattern" as defined in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). It is also unclear whether pushing one's way into a health clinic is within RICO's predicate offenses. The Court simply did not decide this issue in Scheidler.
61 Blakey, supra note 2, at 61, 76 (suggesting that the ACLU originally expressed concern that RICO might apply to political protesters). For a detailed discussion of the ACLU's position, see SenatorJohn L. 70 Both arguments rely on the same point: a RICO "enterprise" ought to be defined in light of legislative history.
RICO grew out of almost twenty years of concern about the influence of the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra. Interest in the Mafia in America began in earnest in the early 1950s with Senate hearings chaired by Estes Kefauver. 7 1 In 1951 Kefauver's committee concluded that " [t] here is a Nation-wide crime syndicate known as the Mafia, whose tentacles are found in many large cities." 72 Not only did the Mafia engage in muscle and murder, but it also gained political influence, engaging in bribery and intimidation to protect its profit seeking op-
67 Blakey, supra note 2, at 61, 62. 83 Id. at 668. "Today the core of organized crime in the United States consists of 24 groups operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation. Their membership is exclusively Italian, they are in frequent communication with each other, and their smooth functioning is ensured by a national body of overseers.... FBI intelligence indicates that the organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia to La Cosa Nostra." Id. at 667 (quoting TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 72, at 6-10). resource paper that was more explicit-naming names of particular Mafiosi and uncovering specific roles within the organization of the Mafia. 8 4 The Commission identified the specific social evil of the Mafia. Organized crime presented a distinct and greater evil than did crime generally. By amassing vast profits from the sale of illegal goods and services, the Mafia used its economic power to "undermine free competition," 8 5 and gain unfair economic advantage over legitimate businesses. 8 6 It also gained a stranglehold on unions, destroying union democracy and providing the mob with extortionate power over the national economy. 8 7 Further, organized crime members bought off law enforcement officers and politicians. 88 The primary evil of the Mafia, however, was its ability to take over and invest in legitimate businesses. 8 9
The Commission's report did not propose substantive law reform; it suggested that conspiracy law was sufficient. 90 The primary problems in fighting the mob were procedural and evidentiary. Therefore, greater resources were needed to induce witnesses to testify against the mob and to protect them before and after they testified. 9 1 RICO's substantive provisions were the product of a series of proposed bills introduced in Congress over the next two years. Senator Roman Hruska proposed legislation in 1967, specifically to enact the 84 
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Commission's recommendations. 92 He left no doubt about the evil that he sought to eradicate, the monolithic "Mafia" and its infiltration of legitimate business. 93 During the next Congress, Senator McClellan, who had conducted earlier hearings into labor racketeering, introduced legislation based on the Katzenbach Commission's report, emphasizing procedural and evidentiary reform that would become an important part of the legislation eventually passed. 94 He identified the same evils-the Mafia and its threat to legitimate business-that Senator Hruska had identified.
95
Senators Hruska and McClellan eventually joined forces, resulting in legislation that included RICO's substantive provisions as well as provisions dealing with procedural reforms. 96 Their earliest proposed bills aimed at attacking the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime syndicates.
9 7 During the long process when various bills were proposed and eventually passed, neither senator attempted to define organized crime. 98 That is almost certainly because of serious doubts that a bill criminalizing membership in the Mafia would be constitutional. 99 At best, it would be impolitic.' 0 0 Defining organized crime in structural terms also seemed daunting. 1 1
Instead, Congress adopted a functional approach to defining organized crime. 02 The statute does not define "pattern of racketeering." Instead, it requires commission of at least two enumerated offenses from a long list of state and federal offenses. 108 That is the functional, rather than structural, approach to defining organized crime. 10 9 But instead of enumerating only the stereotypical Mafia crimes, like gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, extortion, and traffic in narcotics," 0 Congress included a wide array of federal offenses, including mail and wire fraud and securities fraud."' Congress chose this open-ended approach after learning about the way in which La Cosa Nostra did business, shifting its activity to maximize its profits."
12
From the beginning of the legislative process, Congress was concerned with organized crime 1 3 and its infiltration of legitimate business." 4 But RICO did not make organized crime a material element of any of its substantive provisions. Nor did it expressly limit its provisions to the take over or operation of legitimate, as opposed to illegitimate businesses. For several years after its passage, RICO was seldom used either by prosecutors or by civil RICO plaintiffs.' 1 6 This changed in the mid1970s when prosecutors and plaintiffs discovered RICO. Not surprisingly, civil RICO plaintiffs have been enamored with RICO's treble damage and attorney's fee provisions."1 7 RICO also provides access to federal court jurisdiction in cases in which federal district court may provide procedural advantages. 118 Prosecutors gain advantages as well, including favorable procedural and evidentiary rules applicable in RICO cases and heightened criminal penalties, including forfeiture of assets. 119 RICO's "slow start" may be attributed to the belief that it was limited to organized crime cases and to infiltration of legitimate businesses.' 20 This belief stemmed from the fact that numerous lower federal courts attempted to limit RICO in various ways. For instance, some lower federal courts found that RICO required a showing that the defendant was engaged in organized crime;' 2 ' Courts of appeals held that RICO was inapplicable to wholly illegitimate enterprises.' 2 2
A number of courts excluded purely ideological organizations by holding that, for purposes of § 1962(c), a prosecutor or plaintiff had to demonstrate that the racketeering enterprise was for economic gain;' 2 3 and other courts found that a pattern of racketeering was not established solely by showing that the defendant committed two predi- 
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cate offenses.' 2 4 Courts developed various tests to define the "pattern" element, the most restrictive of which required that the defendant engage in more than one criminal scheme rather than merely in multiple criminal acts. 125 In civil RICO cases, courts developed additional limitations, including a requirement that plaintiffs show that they suffered a "racketeering injury," and that an action could not proceed unless the defendant had been convicted of the underlying predicate offenses.
126
Attempts to limit RICO are understandable when one considers RICO's potential breadth. As the Justice Department recognized even before it put in place stringent guidelines, many "nickel and dime" cases come within the literal provisions of the act.
127
Advocate Blakey argues in "The RICO Racket" that the Supreme Court should have relied on the legislative history in its interpretation of "enterprise," and, therefore, the Court should have limited RICO to predatory commercial enterprises.' 28 Thus, in "The RICO Racket," Blakey takes a view similar to those litigants and federal courts who wanted to limit RICO's sweeping provisions.
RICO 
4, 1977)).
128 Blakey, supra note 2, at 61, 76.
and courts that have sought to limit RICO in light of legislative history. 129 And there has been no more aggressive advocate for the expansive application of RICO than Professor Blakey.1 3 0 His key role in drafting the legislation has given him special prominence in the debate.
1
As a scholar interpreting RICO, Blakey's position has been consistent throughout a substantial body of literature, including law review articles, debates, and newspaper articles. Blakey's position on RICO can be summarized as follows: RICO contains a liberal construction provision and that provision should be given effect. 132 Cases limiting RICO to infiltration of legitimate businesses, for example, did so contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. In one article, Blakey criticized the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Sutton, which limited RICO to legitimate businesses, for its reading of legislative history.' 3 3 According to Professor Blakey, the Court should have determined the scope of RICO primarily from the statute and its statutory statement of purposes, not its legislative history. Insofar as Blakey has recognized the relevance of RICO's legislative history, he has argued that the history supports a broad reading of the statute. For example, despite primary interest in organized crime, Congress also discussed the extent to which RICO might apply to white collar criminals. 13 His answer to critics who suggest that RICO has gone beyond congressional intent has been sharp. He cites evidence in the legislative debates that demonstrates that "[a] conscious decision was made by the Senators that this bill would be systemic reform, not limited to organized crime." 13 8 He has repeatedly argued that Congress intended RICO to apply to everyone who violated the statute.' 3 9 Armed with that view of the legislative history and those maxims of statutory construction, one might have analyzed Scheidlerjust as the Supreme Court did. RICO, according to Professor Blakey, is broad and clear in its language, and courts should construe this language liberally. Nothing in § 1961's definition of "enterprise" indicates a congressional intent to limit "enterprise" to economically motivated activities. 140 While some enterprises listed in § 1961 are profit driven, others are not. The obvious example of a listed enterprise not necessarily driven by an economic motive is an enterprise that consists of individuals associated in fact. An association of individuals is openended and can readily include associations with nonprofit motives. Thus, Professor Blakey would assert that since Congress could easily have specified a requirement that an enterprise have an economic motive, but did not, courts should not read one into RICO. '39 Blakey, supra note 136, at 18. In fact, Professor Blakey has specifically urged that Congress overrule the result of United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983), and stated that "RICO was designed to apply to any form of sophisticated criminal group engaging in specific kinds of activities, including violence, without regard to the motive of the perpetrators." Blakey & Perry, supra note 130, at 970. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Ivic-Bagaric rule was implicit in the statute. Health Care, supra note 26, at 3404. 14o 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1984) ("enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity).
141 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) ("If Congress had intended the more circumscribed approach espoused by the Court of Appeals, there would have been some positive sign that the law was not to reach organized criminal activities that give rise to the concerns about infiltration.").
142 Representative Biaggi proposed an amendment that would have made membership in the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra an offense. Ultimately, however, this amendment was re-Blakey has argued repeatedly against reliance on that kind of general view of legislative history. 143 Blakey argues in "The RICO Racket" that there was a "clearly expressed legislative intent" contrary to the result in Scheidler, 144 but he does not cite to one. He cites only Senators Kennedy and Hart's concern that the government might expand its use of "beyond organized crime." 145 However, Blakey has previously cited Kennedy's and Hart's remarks-and Senator McClellan's response to the effect that there is no clear way to draw the line between organized and white collar crime-as evidence of RICO's broad scope. 14 He has repudiated any arguable inference from Kennedy's and Hart's remarks that RICO is limited to organized crime.' 4 7
Blakey eliminated certain offenses from the list of predicate offenses to prevent RICO's application to non-violent (or only moderately violent) protesters. 148 He did not "protect" demonstrators by defining enterprise to include an economic motive. Back to Professor Blakey's rationale: if Congress intended to limit RICO, this intent should be apparent in the statutory language. Any proposed limitation must be in the predicate offenses to RICO. As discussed, 149 the Court did not reach the issue of whether a protester like Scheidler committed extortion.
The inconsistency between Blakey's position generally and his position in "The RICO Racket" is readily apparent. How might RICO apply to an anti-abortion group that prevented abortions by murdering doctors who performed abortions? Advocate Blakey appears to argue that Congress did not intend RICO to apply to wholly ideologijected due to the potential for finding the amendment unconstitutional. See 116 CoNG. REC. 35,343 (Oct. 7, 1970 148 Blakey, supra note 2, at 62 ("No offense relating to trespass or vandalism in the context of protests was included in the final version of RICO. The offense of 'extortion' ('obtaining property by fear') was included, but it was modeled on the early English common law, which emphasized 'obtaining' property ('to get'), not 'depriving' someone of property (forcing them 'to give up')."). 149 See supra text accompanying notes 55 to 56. In fact, Professor Blakey has specifically urged that Congress overrule the result of United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983), and stated that "RICO was designed to apply to any form of sophisticated criminal group engaging in specific kinds of activities, including violence, without regard to the motive of the perpetrators." Blakey & Perry, supra note 130, at 970.
In that same article, written before he argued the Schedler case, Blakey addressed the use of RICO against abortion protesters. There he argued that docket concerns and potential chill of first amendment rights, although not limited to RICO cases, militated in favor of some reform by Congress to prevent discovery abuse and to strengthen guidelines to protect first amendment rights. IR. 156 Blakey & Gettings, supra note 130, at 1035 n.117 ("While RICO had as one of its purposes preventing the takeover of legitimate business by organized crime, it is myopic to read RICO as if that were its only purpose.").
and applies to everyone who violates its provisions. Whether Joseph Scheidler is within RICO's provisions depends on whether he committed the underlying predicate offenses. But it is certainly curious to hear Blakey complain that the Court failed to read into the enterprise concept a narrowing gloss not in its express language.
V. RICO IN THE SUPREME COURT
In "The RICO Racket," Blakey also criticizes the Court for deciding Scheidler pursuant to a "new judicial philosophy, aptly termed the 'New Textualism. ' 159 Guide to RICO Reform, supra note 19, at 661 ("RICO's complexity has attracted several efforts to unscramble the many issues of interpretation it poses.").
160 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (holding that RICO "enterprise" applies to both legitimate and illegitimate organizations); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (holding that interests subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a) (1) are not limited to interests in the enterprise and include "profits" and "proceeds"); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that there was no support in the statute's history, language, or considerations of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action can proceed only against a defendant who has already been criminally convicted. Thus, given the facts, Sedima's action is not barred. The Court also concluded that no "racketeering injury" is required.); HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, a plaintiff or prosecutor must show at least two predicates that are related and that amount to, or threaten the likelihood of continued criminal activity.); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (holding that for defendants to be guilty under RICO they must have participated in the operation or management of the enterprise.).
The Court has decided other cases involving aspects of RICO, but not involving issues relating to RICO The Court rejected this limitation based on the plain language of the statute. "Enterprise," the indictment observed, includes "'any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.'"' 164 Further, Congress could have limited the definition of enterprise had it wanted to do so. 165 The Court relied on the statement of findings, part of the Organized Crime Control Act, the legislation in which RICO appears, and argued that it supported a broad reading of the "enterprise" element. 166 In Russello v. United States, the defendant arranged for arsonists to burn a building he owned.' 67 He received in excess of $300,000 from his insurance company. 168 At trial in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, a jury convicted the defendant of violating § 1962(c). The court also ordered forfeiture of the insurance payments.1 69 The sole issue before the Supreme Court was "whether profits and proceeds derived from racketeering constitute an 'interest' within the meaning of" § 1963(a). 170 A holding that profits and proceeds were not subject to forfeiture would have limited the effectiveness of RICO's forfeiture provision and allowed racketeers to benefit from their illegal conduct. The Court concluded that the insurance proceeds were subject to forfeiture. First, the Court found unambiguous that the defendant "acquired the insurance proceeds at issue in violation of section 1962(c). " 17 1 It then analyzed the meaning of "interest," a term not defined in RICO. 172 The also found that, had Congress intended to limit "interest" to an interest acquired in subsection 1962 (a), an interest secured by investing in an enterprise, it would have done so expressly. 174 In both Turkette and Russello the Court found that, in enacting RICO, Congress had "provide[d] new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots" 175 and had intended to separate organized crime from its economic power derived from its vast illegal profits. 176 However, the idea that RICO might be limited to organized crime was short lived.
In Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., the Court rejected limitations that the Second Circuit imposed on civil RICO. 177 The Second Circuit had held that a plaintiff could bring an action only after a defendant had been convicted and that the plaintiff could recover only for a "racketeering injury." 178 The Supreme Court rejected these limitations, 179 speaking about a broad purpose for RICO as "an aggressive initiative to... develop new methods for fighting crime," 80 notjust organized crime. The Court found few statements in the legislative history relating to the goal of fighting crime generally, but found this goal inherent in the "overall approach" of the statute and in statements made by RICO's opponents that RICO would be an "easy.. . weapon against 'innocent businessmen.'"' 18 The suggestion that RICO was limited to organized crime was dead after Sedima.'
82
In Sedima, the Court did suggest that lower courts might limit RICO through the "pattern of racketeering" element. It observed, specifically, that the "'extraordinary' uses" to which plaintiffs had put RICO were a result of the "failure of Congress and the courts to de- 174 Id. ("It undoubtedly was because Congress did not wish the forfeiture provision of § 1963(a) to be limited by rigid and technical definitions drawn from other areas of the law that it selected the broad term 'interest' to describe those things that are subject to forfeiture under the statute. Congress selected this general term apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth."). velop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.'" 83 The Eighth Circuit attempted to do just that. In Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,1 84 the Eighth Circuit found that a RICO plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering. The Eighth Circuit cited the Court's dicta in Sedima that "pattern" requires a demonstration of "continuity plus relationship," 1 85 something more than the mere commission of two predicate offenses. It found that pattern requires more than one continuing criminal scheme and observed that "[i]t places a real strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern of racketeering activity.'"' 8 6
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this issue in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone. 187 Contrary to the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that, although "pattern" required some relationship between the predicate offenses and some external organizing principle, it did not necessarily require multiple criminal schemes.' 88 The Court did not rely exclusively on RICO's express language. Rather, it found in the legislative history that "pattern" required relationship plus continuity. 189 The Court relied on Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act to define "relationship" as "criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 190 Thus, like prior RICO cases, H.J. Inc. demonstrated the Court's willingness to read RICO broadly, rejecting yet again a lower court's effort at narrowing RICO's breadth.
In its next RICO decision and for the first time, the Court affirmed a lower court decision' 9 ' that narrowed RICO. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, plaintiff-investors purchased notes of a fanmers' co-operative. 192 A local accountant was hired to audit the Co-op.' 9 3 The Co-op 4MCHAEL VITIELL_ l0 was in bad financial shape resulting from mismanagement and fraud of the Co-op's general manager and its accountant.' 9 4 The Co-op's solvency at the time of the audit was dependent on how the auditors valued White Flame, a gasohol plant, sold to the Co-op by its general manager.
The investors based their RICO claim against the accounting firm on the firm's failure to tell the investors its conclusions relating to the insolvency of the Co-op and on its misleading presentation at the Coop's 1982 and 1983 annual meetings. 195 The complaint alleged a violation of § 1962(c), arguing that the auditors "conducted or participated in the affairs of the Co-op, committing both mail fraud and securities fraud... ." 196 The district court granted the firm's motion for summary judgment and relied on the Eighth Circuit's holding in Bennett v. Berg, 19 7 requiring that a § 1962(c) defendant participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.' 9 8 The court of appeals affirmed. 199 The Supreme Court affirmed the Eight Circuit's judgment, 200 effectively narrowing RICO somewhat. However, the Court's methodology was consistent with its prior RICO decisions. Its starting point was the language of the statute. 20 1 Section 1962(c) includes a curious repetition of the word "conduct," used both as a verb and as a noun. That section states that it is unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering." affairs of the enterprise. The Court held that such a reading would render superfluous the noun "conduct" 203 That is, if mere participation were enough, the statute would have made it unlawful for the person to "participate in the affairs of the enterprise," 20 4 not "participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise." Hence, because Congress used "conduct" as a noun as well, "'conduct'. . . include [s] an element of direction." 20 5
The Court also had to define "participate." 20 6 That term might mean nothing more than to render some assistance and, therefore, might not require any management or control over the affairs of an enterprise. First, the Court found that "participate" means "to take part in." 2 07 Second, when read in context, one has to participate in the conduct of the affairs. But that is something less than a requirement that one conduct the affairs of the enterprise. 208 In sum, the Court found "that RICO liability is not limited to those with a formal position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the enterprise's affairs is required." 20 9 In Scheidler, as in its prior RICO decisions, the Court's primary focus was on the plain language of the statute, construed liberally to give effect to RICO's broad remedial purposes. 2 10 In light of the clear and unambiguous language, the Court had little need to consult legislative history. Just as in its other RICO cases, the Court recognized that the legislative history provides some support for both sides of the dispute, and, hence, is not conclusive on RICO's meaning. 21 But the RICO sentence may be imposed despite the fact no social harm in addition to the harm caused by the underlying crimes is shown.
23 2 RICO was justified on the ground that organized crime posed a significant additional social harm beyond that posed by single criminal actors or local conspirators. 233 According the Katzenbach Commission, organized crime represented a threat to the "basic economic 228 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) . 229 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (Those convicted of mail fraud "shall be fined according to this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both."). not always succeeded. 242 Granting that much discretion to the prosecutor, even in a system that allows wide prosecutorial discretion, is troubling-especially when their decisions are made without explanation to the public. 243 Prosecutors might grandstand by bringing racketeering charges against prominent defendants.
4 4
Professor Lynch has argued that Congress intentionally created sweeping RICO provisions, and, therefore, that RICO's broad construction is not simply a result of liberal construction by federal courts. 245 In addition, Lynch has argued that Congress has endorsed RICO's broad application when it has considered legislation amending or attempting to amend RICO. 24 6 But even if Congress is responsible for RICO's breadth, Congress has never debated the desirability of many of its consequences. 24 7 For example, Congress has never rationalized the federalism questions implicated by converting state fraud claims into federal causes of action. 248 It has not debated whether treble damages and attorneys' fees are desirable in a wide array of federal cases. 24 9 Indeed, those sanctions were appropriate to combat the evil empire identified by the Katzenbach Commission2 0 but may be inappropriate in a wide variety of lesser, though culpable, cases.
The 
